Love and redemption are possible but I'm not there yet so may all my enemies die in the meantime

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Biosecurity is often thought about as something that is exported and extended, with pre‐emptive strikes by powerful states on distanced outsiders in order to modernise or wall up agricultural forms and build up surveillance capacity elsewhere […]. Much of this takes the form of large capital investment […] in newly industrialising [places] […]. This civilising mission, as King has put it, marks an extension of state and corporate networks in the name of biosecurity at home (King 2002), and in the name of market expansion. This geography of disease and response networks extended over space conforms to what Wald has called an outbreak narrative […]. “ … the ‘primitive farms’ of Guangzou, like the ‘primordial’ spaces of African rainforests, temporalize the threat of emerging infections, proclaiming the danger of putting the past in (geographical) proximity with the present” (Wald 2008). The coming plague (Garret 1994), even if aided and abetted by a globalised network, remains an arrival at‘our’ door, from an elsewhere. The elsewhere is then the target object for new borderlines, reproducing logics of colonial and economic power. […]   

Closure encircles an imagined community.

As others have shown, this is a geopolitical process, whereby biosecurity is played out along familiar lines. There are particular sovereignties that are often being shored up […] and particular forms of economic activity that are being promoted […]. And yet, this approach to life and disease, with its geometrical or Euclidean spaces of inside and outside […] is questionable on a number of grounds. In the first place, borders are always also contact points; they join worlds together and act as conduits as well as barriers.

Indeed, the permeability of walls is a requirement for life to live, to circulate. […]

Enclosing life is no guarantee of safety. […] For Brown, walls are testament to an ongoing and inevitable failure. They are, she argues, the last attempts to shore up a failing sovereignty, consecrating the very boundary corruption they would contest (Brown 2010). This last ditch feel to closure is perhaps no more apparent than when the objects to be excluded are sub‐microscopic […]. Indeed, the inevitable failure of barriers is a characteristic of the emerging infectious disease literature of the last few decades. […] This inevitable failure is more than a matter of things crossing over walls, it is also a matter of contact between categories (health and diseases) […] and perhaps most significantly, the promotion of false securities. In short, walls […] make matters less rather than more safe. […]

Beyond this illusory if comforting quality of borderlines […], it is important to remember that walls not only mark attempts to keep things out, they also enclose. In doing so, they can restrict life and living inside. They can exclude ‘more’ life, or the excessive and the wild, at the cost of retaining ‘mere’ life, or the barest of living conditions.

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Steve Hinchliffe, John Allen, Stephanie Lavau, Nick Bingham, Simon Carter. “Biosecurity and the topologies of infected life: from borderlines to borderlands.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers. 12 August 2012.